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This paper presents the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND), an integrated assessment model
of climate change, and discusses selected results. FUND is a nine-region model of the world economy and its interactions with climate,
running in time steps of one year from 1990 to 2200. The model consists of scenarios for economy and population, which are perturbed
by climate change and greenhouse gas emission reduction policy. Each region optimizes its net present welfare. Policy variables are
energy and carbon efficiency improvement, and sequestering carbon dioxide in forests. It is found that reducing conventional air pollution
is a major reason to abate carbon dioxide emissions. Climate change is an additional reason to abate emissions. Reducing and changing
energy use is preferred as an option over sequestering carbon. Under non-cooperation, free riding as well as assurance behaviour is
observed in the model. The scope for joint implementation is limited. Under cooperation, optimal emission abatement is (slightly)
higher than under non-cooperation, but the global coalition is not self-enforcing while side payments are insufficient. Optimal emission
control under non-cooperation is less than currently discussed under the Framework Convention on Climate Change, but higher than
observed in practice.
Keywords: integrated assessment of climate change, optimal control, game theory, secondary benefits
1. Introduction
This paper asks the questions whether and (if so) how
much and where to abate anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions, so as to limit climatic change. Of course, these
questions are not answered, but some insights are generated
by applying the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Nego-
tiation and Distribution, version 1.5. The insights obtained
are limited by this integrated assessment model, not only
in the sense that the insights do not consider what is not in
the model, but also in the sense that the insights are only
valid for the part of the assumption space explored by the
model. These limitations are partly lifted by complement-
ing the model’s outcomes with findings in the literature.
FUND is classified by the IPCC (Weyant et al. [35])
as a ‘policy optimization’ model, that is, an integrated as-
sessment model (IAM) that advices policy makers what an
optimal climate policy looks like, rather than evaluating the
consequences of proposed policies. Three prominent IAMs
of this type are CETA (Peck and Teisberg [21–25]), DICE
(Nordhaus [17–19]) and MERGE (Manne and Richels [16],
Manne et al. [15]). FUND deviates in a number of ways
from these models. Firstly, FUND’s economic module is
simpler even than DICE’s, in order to allow uncertainty
analysis (the topic of a future paper). FUND’s greenhouse
gas emission (reduction) module is comparable to DICE’s,
and thus simpler than CETA’s and MERGE’s. Secondly,
the climate impact module of FUND is more complex than
the other models’. The most important differences are that,
in FUND, impacts depend, to a large extent, on the rate
of climate change and on vulnerability of climate change
(a function of mainly per capita income). The time profile
and extent of impacts is very different in FUND. Thirdly,
FUND includes no-regret measures for economic and en-
vironmental measures while the other models define this
away by readjusting their baseline scenarios. Fourthly,
FUND solves optimal emission control for more regions
both cooperatively and non-cooperatively. To date, sim-
ilar results have only been reported for RICE (Nordhaus
and Yang [20]), although the other modelling teams are
working on this. More analytical treatments of greenhouse
games can be found in Eyckmans et al. [3], Fankhauser and
Kverndokk [4] and Hoel [5–8]).
Section 2 briefly describes the model. Section 3 runs
FUND in its basic settings, using best guesses for socio-
economic development, climate change, impacts and costs
of emission reduction. FUND is capable of running in
eight different optimization modes (top-down vs. bottom-
up; cooperative vs. non-cooperative; with vs. without inter-
regional capital transfers), the results of which are discussed
in section 3. Section 4 analyzes how sensitive these results
are to plausible variations of the assumptions on parame-
ters. Section 5 concludes by revisiting the questions asked
above, and by outlining future research.
2. Model description
Figure 1 presents the flow diagram of FUND. Tol [33]
gives a full equation-by-equation description of the model,
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Figure 1. Flow diagram of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution, version 1.5.
which is available from the author upon request. Tol [34]
gives a detailed analysis of the climate change impact mod-
ule. Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous
scenarios and endogenous perturbations, specified for nine
major world-regions, defined in table 1. The model runs
from 1990 to 2200, in time steps of a year.
2.1. Exogenous forces
The exogenous scenarios concern the rate of economic
growth, the population growth, autonomous energy effi-
ciency improvements, the rate of decarbonization of the
energy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements),
and methane and nitrous oxide emissions.
2.1.1. Population
Regional population growth is based on the Worldbank’s
population projections (Bulatao et al. [2]). Population falls
with climate change deaths, resulting from changes in heat
stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat
and cold stress are assumed to affect only the elderly,
non-reproductive population; heat stress only affects ur-
ban population. The share of urban in total population is,
up to 2025, based on the World Resources Databases; af-
ter 2025, urban population slowly converges to 95% of total
population. Population also changes with climate-induced
migration between the regions.
2.1.2. Economy
Gross regional product (GDP) per capita income grows
exogenously according to the standardized scenario of the
Energy Modeling Forum Round 14: Integrated Assessment
of Climate Change, which is close to the IS92a scenario
of the IPCC (Leggett et al. [14]). Each year, consump-
tion (75%) and investment (25%) are lowered by the tan-
gible impacts of climate change. Consumption and invest-
ment are also lowered by the tangible impact of conven-
tional air pollution, and by the spendings on greenhouse
gas emission reduction.
2.1.3. Energy and emissions
Total energy use grows with GDP and falls with the
(exogenous) autonomous energy efficiency improvement
(AEEI) and the policy induced energy efficiency improve-
ment. Carbon dioxide emissions grow with total energy
use and fall with the exogenous autonomous carbon effi-
ciency improvement (ACEI) and policy induced carbon ef-
ficiency improvement. The sum of AEEI and ACEI roughly
matches the AEEIs of the EMF14 standardized scenario.
Carbon dioxide emissions from land use changes follow
the IPCC IS92a scenario (Leggett et al. [14]), but can be
reduced by policy intervention.
2.2. Endogenous variables
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the at-
mospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and
nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the impact of
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Table 1
Regions of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution.
Region (acronym) Description
OECD-America (OECD-A) Canada, USA
OECD-Europe (OECD-E) European Union, Norway, Iceland, Malta,
Switzerland, Turkey, Israel
OECD-Pacific (OECD-P) Japan, Australia, New Zealand
Central and Eastern Europe and the Poland, former Chzechoslovakia, Hungary,
former USSR (CEE&fSU) Bulgary, Romania, Albania, former Yugoslavia,
former Soviet Union
Middle East (ME) Asian-Arabic countries, Iran
Latin America (LA) South and Middle America, Caribbean
South and Southeast Asia (S&SEA) Rest of Asia and Oceania, stretching from
Afghanistan to Papua New Guinea, including
archipalogo nations in Indian and Pacific oceans
Centrally Planned Asia (CPA) China, Laos, Mongolia, Vietnam, North Korea
Africa (AFR) Africa
Table 2
Monetized estimates of the impact of global warming (in 109 US$).
Region Species Life Agric. Sea Extreme Total
Level (global mean temperature: +2:5C; sea level: +50 cm; hurricane activity: +25%;
winter precipitation: +10%; extratropical storm intensity: +10%)
OECD-A 0.0 −1.0 −5.3 0.9 2.5 −2.9
OECD-E 0.0 −1.1 −6.0 0.3 0.3 −6.5
OECD-P 0.0 −0.5 −6.1 1.5 5.5 0.3
CEE&fSU 0.0 3.7 −23.2 0.1 0.2 −19.1
ME 0.0 3.5 3.1 0.1 0.0 6.6
LA 0.0 67.0 7.3 0.2 0.0 74.5
S&SEA 0.0 81.4 15.8 0.2 0.6 98.8
CPA 0.0 58.4 −22.2 0.0 0.1 36.3
AFR 0.0 22.5 5.4 0.1 0.0 28.0
Rate (global mean temperature: 0.04C/year; other variables follow)
OECD-A 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.2
OECD-E 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7
OECD-P 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0
CEE&fSU 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
ME 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
LA 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6
S&SEA 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6
CPA 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5
AFR 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
carbon dioxide emission reductions on economy and emis-
sions, and the impact of the damages of climate change on
the economy and the population.
2.2.1. Atmospheric composition
Greenhouse gases are taken up in the atmosphere, and
then geometrically depleted; life-times are taken from Titus
and Narayanan [31]. Industrial carbon dioxide is exoge-
nous. Carbon dioxide from land use change, methane and
nitrous oxide follow exogenous emission scenarios (based
on IS92a).
2.2.2. Climate change
Radiative forcing for carbon dioxide, methane and ni-
trous oxide are based on Shine et al. [30]. FUND calculates
sea level, hurricane activity, winter precipitation, and winter
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Table 3
Duration of damage memory per category.a
Category Years Category Years
Species loss 100 Immigration 5
Agriculture 10 Emigration 5
Coastal protection 50 Wetland (tangible) 10
Life loss 15 Wetland (intangible) 50
Tropical cyclones 5 Dryland 50
a Damage is assumed to decline geometrically such that after the dis-
played life-time only one per cent of the initial damage remains.
Source: Tol [33].
storm activity because these feed into the damage module.
However, these factors depend linearly on the global mean
temperature. In the current model version, this is merely
accounting; a future version of the model will improve on
this. A future version will also investigate the influence
of sulphate aerosols (a regional climate effect) on optimal
regional greenhouse gas emission reduction. The climate
module of FUND is calibrated to mimic the outcomes of
more complex models. In the base case, global mean tem-
perature rises in equilibrium by 2.5C for a doubling of car-
bon dioxide equivalents. FUND’s temperature profile over
time is also typically as can be found for the IS92a scenario
in the last IPCC report (Kattenberg et al. [12]).
2.2.3. Climate impact
A limited number of categories of the impact of climate
change is considered. The damage module has two units
of measurement: people and money. People can die (heat
stress, malaria, tropical cyclones), not die (cold stress), or
migrate. These effects, like all impacts, are monetized.
Damage can be due to either the rate of change (bench-
marked at 0.04C/yr) or the level of change (benchmarked
at 2.5C). Damage in the rate of temperature change slowly
fades at a speed indicated in table 3. Damage is calcu-
lated through a second-order polynomial in climatic change.
Damage is distinguished between tangible (market) and in-
tangible (non-market) effects. Tangible damages affect in-
vestment and consumption; through investment, economic
growth is affected; through consumption, welfare is af-
fected. Intangible damages affect welfare. Relative vul-
nerability to climate change changes with economic devel-
opment in many ways. The importance of agriculture falls
with per capita income growth, and so do malaria incidence
and the inclination to migrate. Heat stress increases with
urbanization. The valuation of intangible increases with per
capita income.
2.2.4. Emission reduction
Two ways to reduce carbon dioxide emissions are
treated: energy and carbon efficiency improvement, and
forestry measures. The impact of policies to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions from energy use is twofold. On the one
hand, technology is changed by the intervention, so that
(i) the amount of energy needed to produce one dollar is
(permanently) lowered; and (ii) the amount of carbon diox-
ide emitted to produce one joule of energy is (permanently)
lowered. On the other hand, economic growth or economic
output is lowered, depending on whether FUND uses its
top-down or bottom-up parameterization. The main differ-
ence between top-down and bottom-up is the cost function.
In both cases, the reduction cost function is quadratic, but,
in the top-down parameterization, reduction costs are much
higher. Top-down models by and large reflect an econo-
mist’s view of the energy system. Such models typically
assume that energy is currently supplied in an optimal way
(i.e., at minimum costs); therefore, emission reduction is
expensive. Bottom-up models by and large reflect an en-
gineer’s view of the energy system. Such models typi-
cally assume that moving energy supply to the technolog-
ical frontier would reduce emissions while saving money;
therefore, emission abatement is cheap, if not beneficial.
See Hourcade et al. [9] for a more thorough discussion.
Table 4 displays the parameters for the top-down cost func-
tion. Table 5 displays the parameters for the bottom-up cost
function. An energy and carbon efficiency improvement
programme imposes a measure in 1990, and maintains it at
this level for a period of 10 years. After 10 years, the mea-
sure is increased with the same amount as in 1990. This
procedure is repeated 6 times. In this manner, emission re-
duction is controlled by one parameter so that an optimum
can readily be found. The value of the most important pol-
icy variable – emission control in the 1990s – is hardly
affected by this simplification.
2.2.5. Secondary benefits
Besides emission reduction and economic costs, FUND
also considers the secondary benefits, i.e., reduced conven-
tional air pollution. Secondary benefits are linear in emis-
sions. Air pollution damage is defined in deviation from the
present. The parameters can be found in table 6. The dam-
age coefficient falls over time with the autonomous energy
and carbon efficiency improvements.
2.2.6. Afforestation
Forestry measures lead to a direct uptake of carbon diox-
ide. The costs of afforestation are assumed to be quadratic
in the amount of carbon sequestered. The parameters can
be found in table 7. The costs of slowing deforestation
are assumed to equal two-thirds of those of afforestation.
Slowing deforestation is constrained by deforestation. Af-
forestation and slowing deforestation are implemented in a
cost-effective manner. An afforestation programme absorbs
a certain, fixed amount of carbon over sixty years.
2.3. Optimization
2.3.1. Objective function
The costs of emission reduction are weighted against
the avoided damage of climate change. The criterion is the
net present value of average utility, a mixture of per capita
income, tangible and intangible damage of climate change
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Table 4
Parameters of cost function for CO2 emission reduction, top-down studies.
Region T T 1% red.a 10% red.b
OECD-Americac 0.0134 0.6296 0.02 0.76
OECD-Europed 0.0367 0.4081 0.04 0.77
OECD-Pacificd 0.0542 0.4262 0.06 0.97
Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Unione 0 1.6335 0.02 1.63
Middle Eastf 0.0097 0.4982 0.01 0.60
Latin Americag 0 12.0296 0.12 12.03
South and South-East Asiag 0 3.8450 0.04 3.85
Centrally Planned Asiah 0.0093 0.4655 0.01 0.56
Africai 0.0097 0.4982 0.01 0.60
a Total costs (as per cent of GDP) of a one per cent cut in carbon dioxide emissions.
b Total costs (as per cent of GDP) of a ten per cent cut in carbon dioxide emissions.
c Best fit on IPCC estimates (Hourcade et al. [9]).
d Best fit on IPCC estimates (Hourcade et al. [9]).
e Best fit on IPCC estimates (Hourcade et al. [9]).
f Assumed equal to Africa.
g Second order Taylor approximation around zero of cost curve of Rose and Stevens [27].
h Best fit on IPCC estimates (Hourcade et al. [9]).
i China cost curve adjusted so as to reflect the claim of Rose and Stevens that costs in Africa and China are the same, in absolute
terms, per tonne of carbon.
Table 5
Parameters of cost function for CO2 emission reduction, bottom-up studies.
Region S S 1% red.a 10% red.b
OECD-Americac −0:0100 0.1700 −0:01 0.07
OECD-Europed −0:0100 0.1700 −0:01 0.07
OECD-Pacificd −0:0100 0.1700 −0:01 0.07
Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Unione −0:0035 0.1700 0:00 0.14
Middle Eastf −0:0073 0.9546 0.00 0.88
Latin Americag −0:0073 0.9546 0.00 0.88
South and South-East Asiag 0.0093 0.2180 0.01 0.31
Centrally Planned Asiah 0.0093 0.2180 0.01 0.31
Africaf −0:0073 0.9546 0.00 0.88
a Total costs (as per cent of GDP) of a one per cent cut in carbon dioxide emissions.
b Total costs (as per cent of GDP) of a ten per cent cut in carbon dioxide emissions.
c Best fit on IPCC estimates (Hourcade et al. [9]).
d Assumed equal to OECD-America.
e Best fit on IPCC estimates (Hourcade et al. [9]).
f Assumed equal to Latin America.
g Best fit on IPCC estimates (Hourcade et al. [9]).
h Assumed equal to South and South-East Asia.
and air pollution, and emission reduction costs. Yearly
welfare follows
Wj,t = ln

Yj,t −DIntj,t − LIntj,t
Pj,t

= ln

Yj,t
P pj,t

+ ln(1−Ωj,t)
 ln

Yj,t
Pj,t

−Ωj,t − 12Ω
2
j,t, (1)
where
Ωj,t =
LIntj,t +D
Int
j,t
Yj,t
(2)
with Wj,t, the welfare of region j in year t, Y , gross
domestic product, P , total population, LInt, the intangible
costs of global warming, and DInt, the intangible costs of
air pollution. Welfare is standard – natural logarithm of
per capita income1 – in its tangible attributes, but only
1 Note that the savings’ rate is constant.
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Table 6
Marginal secondary benefits of carbon emission reduction.
Region Tangible Intangible Total Doublinga
($/tC) ($/tC) ($/tC) (% GDP)
OECD-A 7.50 7.50 15.00 0.42
OECD-E 6.22 4.96 11.18 0.25
OECD-P 1.93 2.09 4.02 0.05
OECD 6.30 5.83 12.13 0.27
CEE&fSU 6.13 3.33 9.46 0.39
ME 0.45 0.11 0.56 0.25
LA 1.44 2.25 1.69 0.06
S&SEA 2.11 0.12 2.23 0.11
CPA 3.07 0.14 4.01 0.69
AFR 0.93 0.06 0.99 0.04
non-OECD 2.73 0.96 3.69 0.29
World 4.16 2.91 7.07 0.27
a The cost (tangible and intangible) a doubling of fossil fuel use would have, under the assumptions that the marginal
damage and emission coefficients are constant.
Table 7
Afforestation cost parameters.
Region Constant () Linear () Square (γ)
(1000$) (1000$/tC) (1000$/tC2)
OECD-America 0.005 −0:0333 0.00062
OECD-Europe 0.007 −0:0467 0.00056
OECD-Pacific 0.004 −0:0267 0.00042
Central and Eastern Europe and 0.007 −0:0467 0.00049
the former Soviet Union
Middle East 0.003 −0:0205 0.00626
Latin America 0.002 −0:0133 0.00006
South and South-East Asia 0.002 −0:0133 0.00003
Centrally Planned Asia 0.003 −0:0200 0.00020
Africa 0.002 −0:0075 0.00007
approximately so in the intangibles. The specification is
the second order Taylor approximation of ln(1 − Ω). An
approximation is used because it cannot be excluded that
Ω > 1, rendering utility unbounded if using the natural
logarithm. Ω > 1 would obtain if the monetary value of
the intangible impacts exceeds income2 in a particular year,
for instance if more than 0.5% of the population dies from
climate change. Such an extreme case could occur in an
uncertainty analysis; attaching a welfare of minus infinity
to this situation would lead expected welfare to be minus
infinity as well, no matter how small the chance that this
occurs.3
Net present welfare is
NPWj =
2200X
t=1990
Wj,t(1 + j)1990−t: (3)
The discount rate  reflects the pure rate of time preference.
The discount rates are set to 1% per year for all regions; 1%
is low from an economic perspective, but high from a sus-
2 There is little reason to restrict monetized welfare loss to ability to pay.
3 In FUND, version 1.4, this was observed (Tol et al. [32]).
tainability perspective (cf. Arrow et al. [1]). The discount
rates are fixed over time in order to reflect the interests of
present-day decision makers.
2.3.2. Solutions and algorithms
FUND optimizes in eight modes. Firstly, the costs of
emission reduction can be specified with a top-down or a
bottom-up parameterization. Secondly, regions can coop-
erate or not. In the non-cooperative case, a Nash–Cournot
solution is calculated iteratively. The starting point is uni-
lateral action. Each region then learns of the other regions’
plans and adjust its policy. Next, each region learns of the
adjusted plans, and so on, until an equilibrium is reached.
Convergence is acheived in all cases, and rapid in most.
In the cooperative case, global welfare is defined as the
sum of the regional welfares.4 Thirdly, optimizations can
be carried out with and without interregional capital trans-
fers.
4 In a robustness analysis, global welfare was specified as the product
of regional welfare (Bernoulli–Nash), and similar to regional welfare
using global income and population as inputs. Optimal control is little
sensitive to this.
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Remember that all variables of FUND are either directly
or indirectly determined by exogenous scenarios – no opti-
mization is required to calculate the business as usual sce-
nario (or any other scenario). Greenhouse gas emission
control is the only variable that is optimized. The solution
technique is a fancy grid search, where the fanciness lies in
the variable step-size and the stopping rule, which assumes
that there is a unique optimum.5
2.3.3. Interregional capital transfers
The regions interested in greenhouse gas emissions not
necessarily coincide with the regions where this may be
achieved in the cheapest or most effective manner. There-
fore, interregional capital transfer may contribute to emis-
sion abatement. This is modelled in the following way.
First, all regions are assumed to have implemented the
measures according to the non-cooperative game described
above. This is in the spirit of the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which states that measures implemented
in a foreign country are not to replace national emission
reductions. Note that this is not necessarily an efficient
solution.
Each region then evaluates additional abatement mea-
sures. If a measure shows to be beneficial, i.e., increasing
the region’s own net present welfare, it is implemented.
Otherwise, a ‘price’ X (equal to the net present welfare
without the measure minus the net present welfare with
the measure) is attached to it. This ‘price’ equals the net
present welfare of capital transfer K, so
X =
2200X
t=1990
1
(1 + )t

ln
 (Y1990 +K)(1 + g1990)t
P1990(1 + p1990)t

− ln

Y1990(1 + g1990)t
P1990(1 + p1990)t

= ln

1 + K
Y1990
 2200X
t=1990
1
(1 + )t , (4)
where Y1990 denotes the gross regional product in 1990 and
g its growth, and P1990 total population in 1990 and p its
growth rate (note that 1990 growth rates are used only for
notational convenience – the crucial assumption is that cap-
ital transfers do not influence economic growth rates). This
leads to
K = Y1990
(
eX=88:6 − 1: (5)
Next, all measures plus the associated capital transfers of
all regions are offered to the clearinghouse and evaluated
by all regions. The evaluation is based on the net present
welfare of the investing region which transfers an amount
of capital equal to K to the receiving region which imple-
ments the emission reduction; the evaluation of the bidder
is also based on (5). The (hypothetical) auctioneer grants
the transfer right to the region with the highest welfare
5 This assumption has been verified (for the base case assumptions and a
limited set of alternative assumptions) in a grid search without endoge-
nous stopping rule.
gain. If this gain is positive, the transfer is implemented.
Otherwise, it is not.
Interregional capital transfers can also be evaluated in
the cooperative case. Emission reduction measures are first
evaluated without interregional capital transfers. Global
welfare is optimized. Next, the winners from cooperation
compensate the losers; the winners pay proportional to their
gain. The bilateral capital transfers of the non-cooperative
game are thus transformed to multilateral capital transfers.
It may of course happen that the capital transfers prove not
to be sufficient to offset welfare losses in some regions –
this is the case if poorer regions (where additional income
has a relatively high additional welfare) are to transfer cap-
ital to the richer regions (where additional income has a
relatively low additional welfare).
3. Base case results
This section discusses the outcomes of FUND under best
guesses for all parameters. Sensitivity analyses are the topic
of the next section. Uncertainty analyses and a discussion
of the robustness of FUND to changes in its functional
specification are postponed to future papers.
3.1. Business as usual
The business as usual scenario consists of three parts:
(i) the potential growth of population and economy, as ex-
ogenously defined above, and the resulting carbon dioxide
emissions; (ii) the corresponding damage from conventional
air pollution; and (iii) the corresponding climate change and
its impacts. It is important to distinguish between these
three components because of the feedback of damage on
population and economy. Remember that the business as
usual scenario does not require any optimization.
Population is assumed not to be affected by conven-
tional air pollution. With climate change added, heat stress,
malaria and emigration reduce population; cold stress and
immigration increase population. In the OECD, Eastern Eu-
rope and the former Soviet Union, climate change leads on
balance to some additional population growth; in the other
regions, population grows a little less because of climate
change.
Figure 2 displays per capita income (potential, potential
including air pollution, and potential including air pollu-
tion and climate change) in OECD-Europe and South and
South-East Asia. Air pollution and climate change have
significant impacts on economic development, particularly
in the poorer regions. Nevertheless, convergence between
the regions can be observed. Note that this is a property
of the scenarios and that this is not necessarily a realis-
tic assumption (Pritchett [26]). The pattern of industrial
carbon dioxide emissions is similar to the pattern of in-
come. Carbon dioxide emissions are projected to increase
considerably. Some convergence is noticeable, but regional
differences remain large.
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Figure 2. Income per capita (in US dollars) in OECD-Europe (left axis)
and South and South-East Asia (right axis), 1990–2200, for the potential
growth (top line), potential growth plus conventional air pollution (middle
line) and business as usual scenarios (bottom line). Air pollution and
climate change reduce per capita income.
Figure 3. Tangible and intangible damage of climate change (in per cent of
GDP) for OECD-Europe and South and South-East Asia for the business
as usual scenario, 2020–2200. Intangible damage in S&SEA is on the
right y-axis.
Figure 3 displays the tangible and intangible damages
due to the enhanced greenhouse effects for OECD-Europe
and South and South-East Asia for the business as usual
scenario, including air pollution and, of course, climate
change. The period 1990–2019 is not displayed as decision
makers are assumed not to be able to influence the dam-
age in this period; actual damages are distorted during this
time because of the assumption that damage is zero in 1990.
Tangible damages fall over time, as briefly outlined above.
Main influences are the share of agriculture in GDP, and the
number of immigrants. In OECD-Europe, intangible losses
rise at first, but start falling in the 22nd century. The rea-
son is that, as a function of the level of change, decreased
cold stress slightly outweighs increased heat stress.6 In
6 Heat stress figures are based on Kalkstein and Tan [11], which is an
update of Kalkstein [10]. Cold stress estimates have not been updated.
A more serious problem is that, in FUND, there is no upper limit to the
avoided cold stress deaths. However, this specification does not affect
optimal emission control in a notable way. So, a solution to this potential
problem is postponed to future work.
addition, the pace of climate change gradually levels off,
because population growth, economic growth and emission
intensity slowly decline, and the atmosphere gets radia-
tively satiated. In South and South-East Asia, intangible
damages keep increasing. Intangible damage is strongly
pushed upwards by the increase in per capita income, but
pushed downwards by decreasing vulnerability for malaria
and emigration.
3.2. No regret
No regret policies can be undertaken for two reasons.
Firstly, the economic benefits of emission reduction can
lead regions to abate carbon dioxide emissions. Secondly,
avoided conventional air pollution can be a reason for abate-
ment. Table 8 displays the optimal emission abatement in
case both air pollution damage and climate change are set
to nought, and in case only climate change is set to nought.
The economic benefits of emission control are clearly small
and not a substantive cause for action. Conventional air
pollution, however, is a reason to abate greenhouse gas
emissions. Note that the optimal emission control is small.
The figures in table 8 roughly equal the per cent emission
reduction in 1991 (1990 remains uncontrolled), relative to
the baseline. The expenditure on emission control is two
orders of magnitude below 1% of GDP. Bottom-up emis-
sion control is higher, because abatement is cheaper in this
parameterization.
3.3. Non-cooperative optimal abatement
As outlined above, the Nash–Cournot optimum is itera-
tively calculated. Convergence is rapid under the base case
assumptions. In the top-down parameterization, only one
iteration is needed, that is, each region reaches its optimum
regardless of the behaviour of the other region. In the
bottom-up parameterization, only one iteration is needed
for all regions but South and South-East Asia and Africa.
These two regions abate a little bit more when learning of
the other regions’ reduction plans. This so-called ‘assur-
ance’ behaviour (Sen [28,29]) is also observed in earlier
versions of FUND (Tol et al. [32]), but only in exceptional
cases. The explanation is twofold. Firstly, more reduction
elsewhere means less damage in the own region, implying
a higher economic growth and more capacity and need to
reduce emissions. Secondly, the global mean temperature
is logarithmic in the concentration of carbon dioxide. De-
pending on the specification of the damage function, the
higher the base concentration, the less damage one addi-
tionally emitted tonne of carbon causes.
Joint implementation is a popular manner to increase
the efficiency of greenhouse gas emission control (Kuik
et al. [13]). Given certain national emission targets, inter-
national reallocation of emission reduction helps a cost-
effective solution. Joint implementation can readily be
analyzed with FUND. In FUND, joint implementation is
only allowed after all regions have taken measures as un-
der Nash–Cournot. As such, joint implementation does not
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Table 8
No regret emission control; percentage reduction from baseline in the 1990s.
Region Negative costs Air pollution
Top-down Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up
OECD-A 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.28
OECD-E 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.20
OECD-P 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.10
CEE&fSU 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.40
ME 0.00 0.02 0.28 0.18
LA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
S&SEA 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.28
CPA 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.86
AFR 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.06
World 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.33
Source: own calculations.
Table 9
Non-cooperative emission control; percentage reduction in the 1990s.
Region With joint implementation
Top-down Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up
OECD-A 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.28
OECD-E 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.20
OECD-P 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10
CEE&fSU 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.42
ME 0.25 0.16 0.26 0.18
LA 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
S&SEA 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.28
CPA 0.53 0.96 0.56 1.00
AFR 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06
World 0.12 0.34 0.11 0.35
Source: own calculations.
come in place of, but in addition to domestic action, in the
spirit of international agreements. Note that in this specifi-
cation, joint implementation influences efficacy rather than
efficiency. Table 9 displays the outcomes, for both the
top-down and the bottom-up parameterizations. Optimal
emission control increases only slightly compared to the sit-
uation without joint implementation. OECD-America and
South and South-East Asia invest in emission reduction in
other regions, as additional domestic emission reduction is
too expensive compared to the gains of reduced climate
change. Table 10 displays the capital transfers, which are
modest.
3.4. Cooperative optimal abatement
In the cooperative game, the sum of the regional net
present welfares is optimized. In the top-down parameter-
ization, the emission abatement effort of OECD-America,
OECD-Europe, Central and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, the Middle East, Centrally Planned Asia and
Africa is higher than under non-cooperation (cf. table 11).
However, except for the Middle East and Africa, these re-
gions actually lose from cooperation, and so they leave the
global coalition. Upon realizing this, it no longer pays for
the Middle East and Africa either to abate more than under
non-cooperation.
In the bottom-up parameterization, all regions, except
Latin America and Africa, abate more under coopera-
tion than under non-cooperation (cf. table 11). However,
OECD-America, OECD-Europe, Central and Eastern Eu-
rope and the former Soviet Union and Centrally Planned
Asia immediately leave the coalition as that is in their ben-
efit. Upon realizing this, OECD-Pacific and the Middle
East follow, and the situation is back to non-cooperation
again.
So, international capital transfers are needed to ensure
cooperation between the regions. Although global welfare
is higher in the cooperative case than in the non-cooperative
case, the benefits cannot be allocated such that the losers of
cooperation are compensated by the winners. The reason
is that welfare itself is not transferrable from one region
to another. Money is, but welfare is convex in per capita
income while the winners of cooperation are the vulnerable
poor. Their welfare gain from cooperation when translated
into money means little to the rich, at least not enough to
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Table 10
Interregional capital transfers; billion US dollars.a
Region Non-cooperation Cooperation
Top-down Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up
OECD-A −26:2 −22:9 201.7 485.0
OECD-E 0 0 −90:2 −70:3
OECD-P 0 0 −51:1 −143:8
CEE&fSU 0 13.6 118.0 223.7
ME 3.3 22.9 −18:3 −51:5
LA 0 0 −55:7 −157:7
S&SEA −31:7 −71:2 −81:1 −230:6
CPA 50.7 57.6 4.8 25.0
AFR 4.0 0 −28:1 −79:7
a Negative numbers indicate that the region invests in other regions; numbers need not add up to zero due to
rounding.
compensate for their loss from cooperation.
A different route is therefore taken. The non-cooperative
solution is chosen as the point of departure. Additional car-
bon emission reduction measures are considered and eval-
uated as to their effect on global welfare. For measures
which improve global welfare, it is investigated whether
the losing regions (if any) can be compensated by the win-
ning regions.
Additional measures are limited under the base case as-
sumptions of FUND. OECD-America and Central and East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union abate a little bit
more of carbon (cf. table 11). Compensatory capital flows
to these two regions, and to Centrally Planned Asia (which,
like CEE&fSU, is above concluded to be a large winner in
agriculture, provided climate does not change too fast). Ta-
ble 10 displays the capital transfers. The capital transfers
in the cooperative game differ markedly from the capital
transfers under non-cooperation. First of all, capital flows
are much larger in case of cooperation, and all regions are
involved. A more important change is that OECD-America
changes from a net investor in the non-cooperative game
to a net receiver in the cooperative game. The explanation
is that OECD-America is a very effective place to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions, particularly in the shorter term.
Under non-cooperation, none of the individual regions has
either the interest or the capital to convince OECD-America
to abate more, but jointly the other regions do. In the
non-cooperative game, OECD-America invests in joint im-
plementation because it has a limited interest in climate
change, and abatement is cheaper overseas.
3.5. Evaluation
Figure 4 displays the global mean temperature for the
years 1990–2200 for the business-as-usual and the non-
cooperative optimal emission control scenarios. Welfare
maximization does not call for drastic limitation of climate
change. In the bottom-up parameterization, emissions are
stricter controlled than in the top-down parameterization,
because emission control is cheaper. Cooperative emission
Figure 4. Global mean temperature (in degree centigrade) for the busi-
ness as usual scenario and the non-cooperative (Nash–Cournot) emission
control scenarios, for the top-down and bottom-up parameterizations.
control deviates only slightly from non-cooperative emis-
sion control; its consequences for climate change are there-
fore not displayed. Cooperative and non-cooperative emis-
sion control do not lie too far apart for four reasons. Firstly,
the regions of FUND are large. Therefore, a substantial
share of the benefits of emission reduction are internalized.
Secondly, conventional air pollution, a regional problem, is
a major reason to abate emissions. Thirdly, assurance be-
haviour is observed in the non-cooperative case. Fourthly,
even in the cooperative case, emission abatement is modest.
4. Sensitivity analysis
Figures 5 and 6 display the sensitivity of non-cooperative
optimal carbon dioxide emission abatement for OECD-
Europe and South and South-East Asia for the bottom-up
parameterization to a selection of the parameters of FUND.
Optimal emission abatement is sensitive to the driving
forces, particularly to economic growth, autonomous car-
bon and energy efficiency improvements, and air pollution.
The costs of emission reduction and the discount rate are
also important. Optimal abatement goes down if the dis-
count rate goes up, because the relative weight of the up-
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Table 11
Cooperative emission control; percentage reduction in the 1990s.
Region Global optimuma With capital transfers
Top-down Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up
OECD-A 0.10 0.38 0.08 0.32
OECD-E 0.07 0.28 0.03 0.22
OECD-P 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.10
CEE&fSU 0.07 0.52 0.06 0.44
ME 0.26 0.18 0.25 0.16
LA 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
S&SEA 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.26
CPA 0.58 1.04 0.53 0.96
AFR 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06
World 0.14 0.42 0.11 0.36
a Note that the global maximum implies that some regions lose compared to the non-cooperative solution.
Source: own calculations.
Table 12
Non-cooperative optimal emissions and emission control expenditures in 2000.
Region Industrial CO2 emissionsa Expenditureb
Business as usual Top-down Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up
OECD-A 24.29 23.69 21.97 0.005 0.014
OECD-E 19.91 19.67 18.33 0.002 0.006
OECD-P 33.05 33.05 32.18 0.000 0.001
CEE&fSU 7.04 6.73 4.66 0.005 0.031
ME 46.24 44.05 44.85 0.040 0.028
LA 34.79 34.79 34.54 0.000 0.001
S&SEA 37.98 37.85 36.31 0.002 0.019
CPA 36.49 32.56 29.87 0.150 0.232
AFR 49.85 49.36 49.43 0.003 0.003
World 24.89 24.06 22.48 0.007 0.017
a Growth in industrial carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2000, compared to 1990, in per cent of 1990 emissions.
b Expenditure on emission control in the year 2000 as per cent of GDP in 2000.
Source: own calculations.
Figure 5. Sensitivity of bottom-up optimal emission control (% reduction
in the 1990s) in OECD-Europe for 21 cases (indicated on the y-axis) in
deviation from the base case.
Figure 6. Sensitivity of bottom-up optimal emission control (% reduction
in the 1990s) in South and South-East Asia for 21 cases (indicated on the
y-axis) in deviation from the base case.
162 R.S.J. Tol / On the optimal control of carbon dioxide emissions
front mitigation costs goes up. Optimal abatement goes up
if the discount rate goes down, but this effect is less pro-
nounced than one might have expected, because there still
is a trade-off between slowing economic growth, sooner
(through emission abatement) and later (through climate
change).7 The costs of forestry measures have to be de-
creased by a factor twenty (!) to let regions implement this
option. Optimal abatement is little sensitive to climatic
change and its impact, although it is to the way in which
impacts work through to the economy (savings’ rate).
5. Conclusion
The analyses of this paper provide a tentative answer
to the questions whether and (if so) how much and where
to abate anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, so as to
limit climatic change. This section summarizes the answer
obtained with FUND, and compares them to findings in the
literature.
Firstly, should we abate anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions? The answer to this question is an unambiguous
yes. This answer is not restricted to FUND; it is shared
by all other cost–benefit analyses of climate changes, the
most prominent of which are DICE, CETA, and MERGE.
The argument is simple: as climate change causes damage,
it pays to reduce climate change (cf. Weyant et al. [35], for
a further discussion).
Secondly, how much greenhouse gas emissions should
we abate? Table 12 displays the industrial carbon diox-
ide emissions in the year 2000, relative to 1990, for the
business as usual scenario and top-down and bottom-up
optimal control under non-cooperation (cf. table 8). It also
shows the expenditure on emission reduction in that year.
Under the base case assumptions, we should abate some
greenhouse gas emissions, but not that much. The opti-
mal strategy results in a reduced warming between 0.10C
(top-down, non-cooperation) and 0.35C (bottom-up, coop-
eration) of a degree centigrade by the year 2100, close to
the findings of DICE, CETA, and MERGE.8 This is remark-
able, since the damage module of FUND is very different
from the damages in DICE, CETA, or MERGE. However,
FUND includes secondary benefits of emission reduction
and FUND’s discount rate is much lower. This suggests
that, should the discount rate be equalized and the sec-
ondary benefits excluded, FUND favours lower emission
reduction than DICE, CETA, and MERGE. The prime
reason for this lies in the different specification of the cli-
mate change impact module in FUND, which results in
much lower damages (cf. figure 3). For this reason, and
because of the secondary benefits, the observed assurance
7 Note that FUND cannot tinker with the savings’ rate in the optimization.
8 Note that the short term emission reduction is much lower, even though
the reduced warming is about the same. This is explained from the fact
that in FUND emissions are reduced by a permanent improvement in
energy and carbon efficiency, whereas CETA, DICE, and MERGE lower
emissions directly. Emission reduction in the long run is comparable,
however.
behaviour and the size of the regions, FUND’s cooperative
solution lies very close to its non-cooperative solution.
Thirdly, where should we abate greenhouse gas emis-
sions? The answer to the question depends on one’s per-
spective. A major reason to abate carbon dioxide emissions
is the conventional air pollution avoided. This suggests that
emissions should be abated domestically. Climate change
mainly impacts on the poor, so it is in their interest to cut
their emissions. Emission reduction has a larger effect in
the regions which currently emit a lot, but is cheaper in the
poorer regions.
The answers obtained by FUND and other models are
only the first step of a long and arduous journey. Obvious
extensions of the work presented in this paper are to look
deeper into coalition formation, to extend the one-shot de-
cisions to repeated games, and to repeat the exercises under
uncertainty. Based on these first analyses, it appears that
the goals set out in the Framework Convention of Climate
Change (emission stabilization at the short term, concen-
tration stabilization on the longer term) are too ambitious
to maximize welfare. However, it also appears that current
(close to absent) and no-regret policies are too little.
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